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THE PROBLEM WITH NEUROLAW 
DAVID W. OPDERBECK* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article describes and critiques the increasingly popular program of 
reductive neuroLaw. Law has irrevocably entered the age of neuroscience. 
Various institutes and conferences are devoted to questions about the relation 
between neuroscience and legal procedures and doctrines. Most of the new 
“neuroLaw” scholarship focuses on evidentiary and related issues, and is 
important and beneficial. But some versions of reductive neuroLaw are 
frightening. Although they claim to liberate us from false conceptions of 
ourselves and to open new spaces for more scientific applications of the law, 
they end up stripping away all notions of “selves” and of “law.” This Article 
argues that a revitalized sense of transcendence is required to avoid the violent 
metaphysics of reductive neuroLaw and to maintain the integrity of both “law” 
and “science.” 
  
 
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School, and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law, 
Science & Technology. Thanks to Brian Tamanaha, Brad Gregory, Dennis Patterson, and 
Michael Pardo for helpful comments on earlier versions of this Article. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Genetics may yet threaten privacy, kill autonomy, make society homogeneous 
and gut the concept of human nature. But neuroscience could do all of these 
things first.1 
Law has entered the age of neuroscience. Various institutes and 
conferences are devoted to questions about the relation between neuroscience 
and legal procedures and doctrines.2 The MacArthur Foundation recently 
awarded a $4.85 million grant for a Center of Law and Neuroscience at 
Vanderbilt University.3 
Most of the new “neuroLaw” scholarship is important and beneficial. 
NeuroLaw scholars are seeking to better understand, for example, how 
diagnostic tools such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) might 
or might not be useful as evidence in the courtroom.4 Such evidence might 
help determine the presence of brain injury in a negligence case, assess mental 
capacity in a competency hearing, or define “brain death” for purposes of 
interpreting a medical advance directive.5 More controversially, fMRI 
evidence could bear on the mens rea requirement in criminal law when the 
defendant suffers from some mental defect, or on whether a witness is telling 
the truth.6 Such uses of the best available empirical science to help clarify the 
application of legal rules represent the way in which the law’s general 
principles become instantiated in particular situated contexts. 
But some versions of reductive neuroLaw are frightening. Although they 
claim to liberate us from false conceptions of ourselves and to open new spaces 
for more scientific applications of the law, they end up stripping away all 
notions of “selves” and of “law.” They propose not a concept of the “rule of 
law,” but instead a dictatorship of the brain—or of some model of the brain—
and “neural reeducation camps” for those whose brains do not quite fall in 
 
 1. The Ethics of Brain Science: Open Your Mind, THE ECONOMIST, May 25, 2002, at 93. 
 2. See, e.g., THE MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON LAW AND 
NEUROSCIENCE, http://www.lawneuro.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013); Law and Neuroscience, 
VANDERBILT UNIV., http://www.psy.vanderbilt.edu/courses/neurolaw/ (last visited Sept. 18, 
2013) (listing American law schools that offer “Law and Neuroscience” classes); NEUROETHICS 
& LAW BLOG, http://kolber.typepad.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013); Society for Evolutionary 
Analysis of Law, VANDERBILT UNIV., https://www4.vanderbilt.edu/seal/ (last visited Sept. 18, 
2013). 
 3. Amy Wolf, Landmark Law and Neuroscience Network Expands at Vanderbilt, 
VANDERBILT UNIV. (Aug. 24, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://news.vanderbilt.edu/2011/08/grant-will-
expand-law-neuroscience-network/. 
 4. See, e.g., Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the Admissibility 
and Persuasiveness of fMRI, in LAW, MIND AND BRAIN 23 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. 
Goodenough eds., 2009). 
 5. Id. at 25. 
 6. Id. 
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line.7 In this respect, reductive neuroLaw represents the apotheosis of the 
modern drive to replace law with science. This drive must be resisted and 
reversed if law and science are each to retain their integrity. 
Part I of this Article describes the increasingly popular program of 
reductive neuroLaw and surveys the basis for that program in 
paleoanthropology and sociobiology. Part II excavates the philosophical roots 
of attempts to reduce “law” to “science,” of which neuroLaw is the most recent 
manifestation, and shows that those roots extend to medieval theologies of 
voluntarism, nominalism, and univocity. Part III demonstrates why reductive 
neuroLaw represents a form of neuro-fascism. Part IV surveys some alternative 
approaches to and critiques of neuroLaw. Part V argues that a revitalized sense 
of transcendence is required to avoid the violent metaphysics of reductive 
neuroLaw. 
I.  THE OUTLINES OF REDUCTIVE NEUROLAW 
A. The Claims of Reductive NeuroLaw 
Reductive neuroscience suggests that “the brain is a physical entity 
governed by the principles and rules of the physical world” and that “brain 
determines the mind.”8 Contemporary neuroscience thereby claims to elide the 
soul and the mind—what many neuroscientists call the “ghost in the 
machine.”9 As Martha Farah of the University of Pennsylvania’s Center for 
Neuroscience and Society puts it: 
[A]s neuroscience begins to reveal the mechanisms of personality, character, 
and even sense of spirituality, [dualism] becomes strained. If these are all 
features of the machine, why have a ghost at all? By raising questions like this, 
it seems likely that neuroscience will pose a far more fundamental challenge to 
religion than evolutionary biology.10 
Not just religion, but law as well, can be reduced to neuroscience. Legal 
theorists have not missed the implications of the new reductive sociobiology 
and neuroscience for “folk” concepts of the rule of law. Farah notes with some 
understatement that "[t]he idea that behavior is determined by physical causes 
 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 8 (Brent 
Garland ed., 2004). 
 9. Id. at 66. This phrase was originally introduced by Gilbert Ryle in 1949. GILBERT RYLE, 
THE CONCEPT OF MIND 15–16 (1949). 
 10. Martha Farah, Neuroethics, VIRTUAL MENTOR (Aug. 2004), http://virtualmentor.ama-
assn.org/2004/08/oped2-0408.html. 
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is hard to reconcile with the intuitive notions of free will and moral agency on 
which our legal systems are based.”11 
“Free will” is an illusion, many neuroLaw scholars argue. Among their 
most compelling bits of evidence for this claim are studies suggesting that the 
brain signals the body to engage in actions before we become consciously 
aware of the action we will take.12 This “precognition” suggests that our 
actions are automatic responses to stimuli and that our conscious “decisions” 
are merely ex post determinations not to “veto” what the brain has already 
signaled its readiness to do. We have, at best, “free won’t” rather than “free 
will.”13 Therefore, “[a]ccording to neuroscience, no one person is more or less 
responsible than any other for actions. We are all part of a deterministic system 
that some day, in theory, we will completely understand.”14 In this view, the 
notion of “responsibility” is only a “social construct,” law is an instrumentalist 
tool useful for engineering the society we are constructing, and the society we 
are constructing ultimately is reducible to the evolutionary history embedded 
in our brains. 
B. Please Prepare for Your Prefrontal Workout 
One prominent advocate of this vision for neuroLaw is David Eagleman, 
Director of the Initiative for Neuroscience and the Law at the Baylor College 
of Medicine in Houston, Texas.15 Eagleman states the issue for neuroLaw as 
follows: “The crux of the question is whether all of your actions are 
fundamentally on autopilot or whether there is some little bit that is ‘free’ to 
choose, independent of the rules of biology.”16 
Eagleman offers a seemingly mundane example: the everyday activity of 
driving home from work and opening the front door of one’s home.17 Most of 
us will realize, if we reflect on these actions once we are comfortably seated on 
the couch after a long day, perhaps with a cold beer in hand and a football 
 
 11. Martha Farah, Responsibility and Brain Function, CTR. FOR NEUROSCIENCE & SOC’Y AT 
UNIV. OF PA., http://neuroethics.upenn.edu/index.php/penn-neuroethics-briefing/responsibility-a-
brain-function (last visited Sept. 6, 2013). 
 12. Michael S. Gazzaniga & Megan S. Steven, Free Will in the Twenty-first Century, in 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 51, 56 (Brent 
Garland ed., 2004). These experiments, originally conducted by Benjamin Libet in the 1970’s, 
may not in fact support such sweeping conclusions. See, e.g., Daniel C. Dennett, The Self as a 
Responding—and Responsible—Artifact, 1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 39, 39–50 (2003). 
 13. Gazzaniga & Steven, supra note 12, at 57. 
 14. Id. at 68. 
 15. See Neuroscience and the Law, THE INITIATIVE ON NEUROSCIENCE & L. AT BAYLOR 
COLLEGE OF MED., http://www.neulaw.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013). 
 16. DAVID M. EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO: THE SECRET LIVES OF THE BRAIN 166 (2011) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 17. Id. at 141–42. 
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game on the television, that we drove home on mental auto-pilot and that we 
opened the door to our homes without thinking about the location of the 
doorknob. If our route had been changed because of road construction, or if our 
significant other had installed a new door with a different type of opener, 
things would have been different: these new facts would have required greater 
attentiveness. For Eagleman, this means that the conscious aspect of returning 
home from work is only a “little bit” of the story: once we become habituated 
to the routine, it becomes automatic.18 The same is true, he argues, for all of 
our actions, including what we mistakenly attribute to intentionality.19 
Indeed, in a recent interview, Eagleman acknowledged that his view of 
neurobiology undermines libertarian notions of personal autonomy and free 
will.20 Asked whether neuroscience completely erodes, or at least challenges, 
the notion of individual autonomy, he replied, “I’m afraid it does,” “[Y]ou are 
your biology,” and “[W]hat I’m pretty certain about now is that to whatever 
extent we have free will it is only a bit player in what actually happens in 
people’s lives.”21 
Eagleman asserts that “[t]he unique patterns of neurobiology inside each of 
our heads cannot qualify as choices; these are the cards we’re dealt.”22 He 
suggests that “it is difficult to find the gap into which to slip free will—the 
uncaused causer—because there seems to be no part of the machinery that does 
not follow in a causal relationship from the other parts.”23 He argues that 
concepts of “blame” should be replaced with “science” and that 
“[b]lameworthiness should be removed from the legal argot.”24 
Blameworthiness is merely a “backward-looking concept that demands the 
impossible task of untangling the hopelessly complex web of genetics and 
environment that constructs the trajectory of a human life.”25 
Eagleman’s near-mechanistic view of human nature is reflected in his bold 
and ultimately frightening vision of the legal system. Since people do not 
really possess moral agency, the question for the law is not whether the 
accused is to blame for his or her conduct, but rather whether there is 
 
 18. Id. at 166. 
 19. Id. 
 20. ReasonTV, “You Are Your Brain”: David Eagleman on Transforming Criminal Justice, 
YOUTUBE (June 14, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wSQY7zHk5y8. 
 21. Id. Of course, he did not explain how his views about biological determinism are 
consistent with his description of first-person phenomenological qualia (“I’m afraid. . .” “I’m 
pretty certain. . .”). And just moments before offering that grim response, he suggested that 
biofeedback treatments for criminals would provide them with a “libertarian” way to “help 
themselves.” Id. 
 22. David Eagleman, The Brain on Trial, THE ATLANTIC, July–Aug. 2011, at 112, 116. 
 23. Id. at 118. 
 24. Id. at 118, 120. 
 25. Id. at 120. 
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something “different” about the person’s neurobiology that led the person to 
act in a certain way.26 We should think about criminal conduct “in the same 
way we think about any other physical process, such as diabetes or lung 
disease.”27 
Eagleman admits that, at present, only in relatively rare cases can we assert 
with confidence that a person’s anti-social conduct was caused by an 
identifiable brain condition, such as a tumor—but this, he claims, is merely a 
problem of technology.28 In principle, he suggests, science will one day be able 
to measure biological states with a degree of comprehensiveness and 
granularity that will permit a full diagnosis of criminal conduct.29 Culpability, 
he argues, should not “be determined by the limits of current technology.”30 In 
place of traditional legal concepts of fault and blame, Eagleman proposes a 
“forward-looking” system in which criminals would receive bio-feedback 
treatments designed to retrain their brains towards “pro-social behavior.”31 
How does Eagleman define what “pro-social” should mean in a world of 
neurobiological determinism? He speaks of “social contracts,” “society’s 
needs,” and what we can “hope for” as “a society that respects individual rights 
and freedom of thought.”32 All of these concepts, of course, presuppose the 
very “folk” concepts of freedom, autonomy, and intentionality that Eagleman’s 
neuroscience supposedly deconstructs. Yet for Eagleman, these concepts are 
merely artifacts of evolution.33 “A meaningful theory of human biology,” he 
argues: 
[C]annot be reduced to chemistry and physics, but instead must be understood 
in its own vocabulary of evolution, competition, reward, desire, reputation, 
avarice, friendship, trust, hunger, and so on—in the same way that traffic flow 
will be understood not in the vocabulary of screws and spark plugs, but instead 
in terms of speed limits, rush hours, road rage, and people wanting to get home 
to their families as soon as possible when their workday is over.34 
Instead of assuming that people ordinarily possess a degree of agency that 
allows them to choose whether to abide by the law, Eagleman argues that 
“criminals should always be treated as incapable of having acted otherwise.”35 
The role of the legal system would then shift from assigning blame based 
on agency to changing the law-breaker’s brain state in order to produce more 
 
 26. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 174–77. 
 27. Id. at 170. 
 28. Id. at 175–76. 
 29. Id. at 176. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Eagleman, supra note 22, at 120, 122. 
 32. Id. at 121–23. 
 33. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 218–19. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 177. 
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desirable behavior.36 This would be accomplished by a “prefrontal workout” 
consisting of cognitive biofeedback.37 A person’s sentence—their prescribed 
prefrontal workout regimen—would depend on the degree to which the 
person’s biology is “modifiable,” based on some as-yet-undiscovered measure 
of neuroplasticity.38 The concept of variable neuroplasticity is important, 
Eagleman observes, because contrary to the ideals of developed democracies, 
all people are not created equal: “While admirable in spirit, the notion of 
neural equality is simply not true.”39 People vary widely both in nature and in 
nurture.40 With this truth in hand, we could “tailor sentencing and 
rehabilitation” to the individual’s specific neurobiological makeup.41 
C. Paleoanthropology, Sociobiology, and the Human Mind 
Since neuroLaw purports to be rooted in human evolutionary history, it 
might be helpful to examine what, in evolutionary terms, it means to be 
“human.” In fact, the term “human” is elastic in paleoanthropology.42 
Moreover, there is significant disagreement between some 
paleoanthropologists and some evolutionary sociobiologists about what, if 
anything, makes modern humans unique. 
1. Paleoanthropological Narratives 
Paleoanthropologists broadly agree that a “cultural explosion,” a “big bang 
of human culture,” occurred around 60,000 to 30,000 years ago.43 As 
 
 36. Id. at 115. 
 37. Eagleman, supra note 22, at 122. 
 38. Id. at 123. 
 39. Id. 
 40. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 187. 
 41. Eagleman, supra note 22, at 123. 
 42. Scientific convention is to refer to as “human” all hominid species dating back to the 
split in evolutionary lineage from chimpanzees about four million years ago. See, e.g., G.J. 
SAWYER AND VIKTOR DEAK, THE LAST HUMAN: A GUIDE TO TWENTY-TWO SPECIES OF 
EXTINCT HUMANS (2007) (a fascinating and beautifully produced book, which offers 
photographs of forensic reconstructions based on fossil samples of twenty-two species of 
hominids dating back to over seven million years, as well as narratives of the possible lifeways of 
these creatures). The basic outlines of human evolution are not in serious doubt. For a good 
overview of the evidence for human evolution from a paleoanthropological perspective, see IAN 
TATTERSALL, THE FOSSIL TRAIL: HOW WE KNOW WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW ABOUT HUMAN 
EVOLUTION (1995). For a discussion of the genetic evidence for human evolution, see Genetic 
Clues of Relatedness, THE CAMBRIDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN EVOLUTION 293 (Steve 
Jones, Robert Martin & David Pilbeam eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994). The essay accepts as 
true the fossil and genetic evidence for human evolution, but questions the metaphysical 
reductionism that underpins sociobiology and neuroLaw. 
 43. See STEVEN MITHEN, THE PREHISTORY OF THE MIND: THE COGNITIVE ORIGINS OF 
ART, RELIGION AND SCIENCE 151 (1996). As with all things in paleoanthropology, there are 
dissenters even from this widely held view. 
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archaeologist Steven Mithen notes, “[W]ith no apparent change in brain size, 
shape or anatomy in general—the cultural explosion occurred.”44 Similarly, 
paleoanthropologist Ian Tattersall, who curated the American Museum of 
History’s Hall of Human Origins, argues that modern humans “are an 
altogether unprecedented presence on our planet.”45 Further, Tattersall says 
that the notion that “the long human story” represents “an extended and 
gradual struggle from primitiveness toward perfection” is simply false.46 “The 
acquisition of the uniquely modern sensibility” reflected in the cultural 
explosion, Tattersall says, “was instead an abrupt and recent event.”47 
Tattersall believes that our hominid predecessors generally did not possess 
the capacity for symbolic thought and had no robust sense of “self.”48 For 
example, Tattersall describes Homo heidelbergensis, which lived between 
600,000 and 200,000 years ago, as follows: 
These were hardy, resourceful folk, who occupied and exploited a huge range 
of habitats throughout the Old World through the deployment of an amazing 
technological and cultural ingenuity. They were adroit hunters who pursued 
large game using sophisticated techniques, built shelters, controlled fire, 
understood the environments they inhabited with unprecedented subtlety, and 
produced admirable stone tools that at least occasionally they mounted into 
composite implements. Altogether, they lived more complex lives than any 
hominids had ever done before them.49 
And yet, Tattersall observes, “[T]hroughout the period of Homo 
heidelbergensis’s tenure no hominid produced anything, anywhere, that we can 
be sure was a symbolic object.”50 He therefore concludes that: 
If I had to wager a guess, it would be that the intelligence of these hominids, 
formidable as it may have been, was purely intuitive and non-declarative. They 
neither thought symbolically as we do, nor did they have language. As a result, 
we can’t usefully think of them as a version of ourselves, certainly cognitively 
speaking.51 
Although most paleoanthropologists agree that the fact of a “cultural 
explosion” is well documented, they disagree on what caused it. Tattersall 
suggests there are two leading theories: the theory of “mind” and the theory of 
“language.”52 Tattersall himself falls into the “language” camp.53 
 
 44. Id. at 15. 
 45. IAN TATTERSALL, MASTERS OF THE PLANET X (2012). 
 46. Id. at XI. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 67. 
 49. Id. at 142. 
 50. TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 142. 
 51. Id. at 142–43. 
 52. Id. at 213–14. 
 53. Id. at 216. 
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Tattersall acknowledges that “[t]he changeover of Homo sapiens from a 
nonsymbolic, nonlinguistic species to a symbolic, linguistic one is the most 
mind-boggling cognitive transformation that has ever happened to any 
organism.”54 He finds the theory of language compelling because language 
seems to bridge the “symbolic” and “intuitive” aspects of observed human 
nature and because language is a “communal possession.”55 He takes these two 
aspects of human nature—symbolic and intuitive—to correspond to reason and 
emotion.56 
Tattersall suggests that language first developed “in a small community of 
biologically prepared early Homo sapiens somewhere in Africa,” perhaps first 
among children stretching their minds through play, though he acknowledges 
that “[t]he details of this transition will probably forever evade us.”57 Part of 
this “biological preparation,” according to Tattersall, might have involved the 
brain’s ability to make connections between higher areas—the cortex—
“without passing through the older emotional centers below.”58 One of the first 
linguistic functions this might have facilitated, he suggests, was the ability to 
name objects.59 Another possibility he finds plausible is a significant increase 
in the brain’s capacity for working memory, which facilitates executive 
functions such as “decision-making, goal forming, planning, and so on.”60 In 
any event, he concludes, “[I]t seems likely that a random modification of the 
already exapted brain, plus some children at play, led to the literal emergence 
of a phenomenon that changed the world.”61 
Steven Mithen, in contrast, is a prominent proponent of the “mind” school. 
Mithen argues that the cultural explosion “resulted in such a fundamental 
change in lifestyles that there can be little doubt that it derived from a major 
change in the nature of the mind.”62 Mithen draws on evolutionary 
psychologists who think of the “mind” not as a unified command center, but 
rather as a set of specialized modules that gradually developed in response to 
different environmental pressures.63 Instead of the common metaphor of a 
“computer” for the mind, Mithen employs the metaphor of a “Swiss army 
knife.”64 The key breakthrough for the cultural explosion, Mithen argues, must 
have been a new way of connecting the diverse modules of the early human 
 
 54. Id. at 220. 
 55. TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 220–221. 
 56. Id. at 220. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 220, 222–23. 
 59. Id. at 222. 
 60. TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 224. 
 61. Id. at 225. 
 62. MITHEN, supra note 43, at 15. 
 63. Id. at 13–14. 
 64. Id. at 14. 
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mind so that they could communicate and coordinate with each other in new 
ways.65 Here he employs a different metaphor: the human mind became a 
“cathedral,” with different “rooms” that can function seamlessly together.66 
Like a visitor to a cathedral who might walk from the nave to the chapel to the 
altar, cognition could then flow across domains and make unified connections. 
An early Paleolithic person might have known “rock” in one domain that 
included making flake tools, “animal” in another domain that included 
scavenging carcasses for food, and “female” in yet another domain that 
included sex and reproduction—but these different cognitive modules might 
not have communicated with each other.67 An Upper Paleolithic person, in 
contrast, might have been able to make connections between “rock,” “animal,” 
and “female” in ways that gave rise to the symbolic “Venus” figurines found in 
the archeological record starting about 35,000 years ago, or the exquisite Lion 
Man statuette from the Hohlenstein-Stadel Cave in Germany, dating to about 
30,000 years ago.68 
Both Mithen and Tattersall, however, seem to recoil from the implications 
of their observations for any concept of transcendence, even as they exult in 
the transcendent beauty of something like the Lion Man statuette. At the 
conclusion of The Prehistory of the Mind, Mithen declares that “[t]he human 
mind is a product of human evolution, not supernatural creation. I have laid 
bare the evidence. I have specified the ‘whats’, the ‘whens’ and the ‘whys’ for 
the evolution of the mind.”69 Mithen believes his explanations are complete 
and airtight. He seems to have no room for a concept of “why” beyond the 
biological, never mind a concept of causation that could encompass 
“evolution” as part of an act of “creation.” 
In a strange coda to his Masters of the Planet, Tattersall reflects on 
universals and the bell curve.70 He observes that: 
Yes, you can indeed find regularities in human behaviors, every one of them 
doubtless limited by basic commonalities in the structure of our controlling 
organs. But all such regularities are in reality statistical abstractions, and 
people are absolutely uniform in none of them. As a result, if any statistical 
phenomenon could be said to govern the human condition, it would be the 
“normal distribution” or the “bell curve.” . . . 
  In any human characteristic you might care to specify, physical or 
behavioral, you will find a bell curve. . . . For every saint, there is a sinner; for 
every philanthropist, a thief; for every genius, an idiot.71 
 
 65. Id. at 151–53. 
 66. Id. at 151. 
 67. MITHEN, supra note 43, at 160. 
 68. Id. at 155, 162–63. 
 69. Id. at 215. 
 70. TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 228–29. 
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These variations, he suggests, mean there are no universal human 
characteristics, but only variations along a curve.72 Indeed, he claims, “[A]part 
from that basic ability we all share to re-create the world in the mind, perhaps 
the only other true ‘human universal’ we all show is cognitive dissonance.”73 
If Mithen and Tattersall’s reservations about transcendence are correct, 
there can be no “law,” or at least no possibility of the “rule of law.” There may 
be cognitive connections that facilitate language and the production of cultural 
artifacts, but such signs must signify nothing beyond themselves. If there is 
nothing signified, there may be cultural and linguistic structures that encourage 
and enforce behaviors, but there cannot be “law.” 
Yet Tattersall strikes a hopeful note at the end of his coda. Although 
humans have polluted the planet—a fact about which Tattersall does not 
hesitate to offer a negative value judgment rather than a placid observation 
about the normal distribution—there is hope, because “our rational abilities 
and our extravagant neophilia nonetheless remain beyond remarkable.”74 
“From the very first stirrings of the human symbolic spirit,” Tattersall assures 
us, “the technological and creative histories of humankind have revolved 
around an energetic exploration of the innovative potential released by our new 
way of processing information about the world.”75 Thus, “while the auguries 
appear indeed to be for no significant biological change in our species, 
culturally, the future is infinite.”76 
How can Tattersall move from the confines of the normal distribution into 
an infinite future in the course of a few paragraphs? How does he move from 
rejecting all universals to “our rational abilities,” “our extravagant neophilia,” 
“the human symbolic spirit,” the “technological and creative histories of 
humankind,” and “our new way of processing information about the world”?77 
He does not say.78 It seems that Mithen and Tattersall, as archaeologists and 
anthropologists, cannot accept the implications of their own evidence against 
reductive scientism. Purpose, meaning, and even beauty, joy, and hope keep 
bubbling up from the primordial ooze. 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 229. 
 73. Id. This is quite a jarring coda given Tattersall’s exuberant claim in the previous chapter 
that human language, born in the play of children, represents a “communal possession” of 
humanity. It seems that Tattersall must toss aside his prior 220 pages of argument and resign 
himself to the fact that human existence can have no common meaning or purpose. 
 74. Id. at 232. 
 75. TATTERSALL, supra note 45, at 232. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (emphasis added). 
 78. Id. Perhaps this is an example of the human universal of cognitive dissonance. 
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2. Reductive Sociobiological Narratives 
Reductive sociobiology demurs even from the cautiously optimistic stance 
of paleoanthropologists concerning modern human uniqueness. For example, 
David Sloan Wilson, distinguished Professor of Biological Sciences and 
Anthropology at Binghamton University, argues that Darwinian evolution fully 
explains everything, including every aspect of human nature.79 Anyone who 
thinks otherwise, even “intellectuals” who are not religious, is a kind of 
fundamentalist, an “‘academic creationist.’”80 
Wilson is clear in his evangelistic program for his version of evolutionism. 
“First,” he says, “we must abandon the notion that some special quality was 
breathed into us by a higher power.”81 He claims that this does not demand an 
outright rejection of religious faith because, he says, “[M]any people manage 
to combine a vibrant religious faith with a fully naturalistic conception of the 
world.”82 But whatever he means here by “religious faith,” there is no room in 
that faith for anything but the physical world. Wilson’s epistemology is 
uncompromising: 
  What goes for knowledge of the physical world also goes for knowledge 
about ourselves. If something is wrong with your body, your mind, or society, 
it has a naturalistic explanation, just like [a] problem with your car. Believing 
that we have special god-given abilities is like praying to your car on the side 
of the road.83 
Sloan Wilson is not content merely to reduce “religious faith” to nature. He 
must include “culture” as well. “A common claim,” even among non-religious 
people, he notes, “is that ‘biology’ sets broad limits to our behavior, such as 
eating and procreation, but that ‘culture’ determines what we do within the 
broad limits, such as making art rather than babies.”84 This high concept of 
“culture,” he correctly observes, suggests that notwithstanding our 
evolutionary past we are free to choose our future destiny.85 
To this claim that “culture” exerts some kind of downward causality, 
Wilson cries, “Hubris, all hubris!”86 Since whatever attributes make humans 
unique are merely “like an addition onto a vast multiroom mansion” over deep 
 
 79. DAVID SLOAN WILSON, EVOLUTION FOR EVERYONE: HOW DARWIN’S THEORY CAN 
CHANGE THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT OURSELVES 6 (2007). 
 80. Id. at 2–3 (quoting Barbara Ehrenreich and Janet McIntosh, The New Creationism: 
Biology Under Attack, THE NATION, June 9, 1997, at 11). We may note in passing the irony of 
dismissing as “fundamentalist” everyone who disagrees with Sloan’s Darwinian fundamentalism. 
 81. Id. at 68. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. WILSON, supra note 79, at 69. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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evolutionary time, “[i]t is sheer hubris to think that we can ignore all but the 
newest room.”87 Indeed, Wilson claims that humans have regarded themselves 
as “uniquely intelligent, moral, flexible, and capable of aesthetic appreciation,” 
and that most of these are “self-congratulatory and suspect as factual claims.”88 
He thinks it empirically established that “other species far surpass our 
intelligence for specific tasks and that traits associated with goodness can 
evolve in any species, given the right environmental conditions.”89 
Nevertheless, Wilson admits that humans possess a unique capacity to 
construct their own social environments, and indeed “evolutionary social 
constructivism” is the core of his moral and political philosophy.90 The 
essential problem for morality, religion, and politics, in Wilson’s scheme, is 
that “[s]ome individuals are driven to benefit themselves at the expense of 
others or their society as a whole.”91 To illustrate this problem, he surveys 
various game-theoretic models of altruism.92 
In a chapter titled “Love Thy Neighbor Microbe,” for example, he 
describes a bacterial species, Pseudomonas flourescens, which creates a 
polymer mat that sticks the bacteria together in a colony.93 The mat is 
biologically expensive to create and eventually some mutant bacteria instead 
devote energy to reproduction.94 When the mutants begin to thrive, the mat 
collapses, and the colony disintegrates.95 “Thus,” Wilson observes, “is the glue 
of civilization dissolved by sloth!”96 And such “examples of good and evil 
among microbes can be repeated without end because they are based on 
inescapable facts of social life.”97 All of this maps directly onto human 
behavior and human folk concepts of “good” and “evil.”98 But, Wilson 
concludes, “If the traits that we associate with goodness can evolve, then we 
can make them more common by providing the right environmental conditions. 
Far from denying the potential for change, evolutionary theory can provide a 
detailed recipe for change.”99 
 
 87. Id. at 70. 
 88. Id. at 71. 
 89. WILSON, supra note 79, at 71. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 13. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 128–29. 
 94. WILSON, supra note 79, at 128–29. 
 95. Id. at 129. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. WILSON, supra note 79, at 32. Of course, what Sloan Wilson describes here has nothing 
to do with classical notions of “good” and “evil,” which relate to intentional states, virtues, and 
transcendentals. See, e.g., Rachana Kamtekar, Ancient Virtue Ethics: An Overview With an 
Emphasis on Practical Wisdom, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 29, 42–46 
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Similarly, Michael Graziano, Professor at Princeton University’s 
Neuroscience Institute, denies any sense of the transcendent: 
  When we say we are conscious, aware, self-aware, in conscious control of 
our actions, have a stream-of-consciousness understanding of ourselves, what 
we really mean, apparently, is this: there is a system in the brain whose job is 
to construct models of intentionality of other people or of ourselves; and right 
or wrong, confabulated or not, the self-model, continuously updated, 
continuously refined, supplies the contents of our conscious mind.100 
Since the author of this phenomenon is merely a system in the brain, 
Graziano says, “In this sense consciousness—a soul on a trajectory through 
waking life—is a perceptual illusion. It is a perceptual model that is at best a 
simplification and sometimes plain wrong.”101 All intentionality is reducible, 
for Graziano, to individual neurons.102 And what seems like the product of 
self-reflexivity, awareness, and language—the sorts of cultural things Mithen 
and Tattersall argue radically distinguish modern humans from all other 
 
(Daniel C. Russell ed., 2013) (explaining that only virtue is good by nature and that virtue, as a 
whole, is expertise in living); Jean Porter, Virtue Ethics in the Medieval Period, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO VIRTUE ETHICS 70, 83–87 (Daniel C. Russell ed., 2013) (explaining 
that the classical view of diverse virtues are all expressions of some one virtue or ideal of 
goodness, rationality, or charity). But Sloan Wilson has already made his a priori commitment to 
absolute naturalism, so he has dismissed several thousand years of historical reflection on “good” 
and “evil” tout court. Here we must remark on Sloan Wilson’s cry of “Hubris, all hubris!” (Yet 
what is “hubris” in a naturalistic game-theoretic world without transcendent virtues?). 
 100. MICHAEL S.A. GRAZIANO, GOD SOUL MIND BRAIN: A NEUROSCIENTIST’S 
REFLECTIONS ON THE SPIRIT WORLD 65 (2010). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 99–100. Memeology, of course, is one of the more absurdly imaginative inventions 
of materialistic reductionism. For a good critique of memeology, see ALISTER MCGRATH, 
DAWKINS’ GOD: GENES, MEMES, AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 7–8 (2005) (explaining that the 
theory of memes offers a new theoretical framework for exploring the general question of the 
origins, development, and reception of ideas). No one has ever observed a meme, nor by 
definition can memes ever discretely be observed because they are cultural phenomena and not 
encoded in biology like genes. Moreover, if memes can explain “belief after belief” in religion, 
they can do the same in science. This would mean there can be no “science” of archeology or 
paleontology that might offer insights into the development of human consciousness, awareness, 
language, or culture because the idea of something like “archeology” or “paleontology” is just a 
meme, as are any ideas of human consciousness, awareness, language, and culture. Memeology 
itself must be merely a meme, as must the supposed explanatory power of Darwinian evolution. 
Indeed, the very concept of “explanatory power” must be a meme, a “perceptual illusion” as 
Graziano would say. But then there are no “illusions” because the notion of an “illusion,” which 
presupposes a “reality,” is a meme also. Memes therefore cannot “explain” anything, for there are 
no “explanations.” The universal acid consumes itself. See CONOR CUNNINGHAM, DARWIN’S 
PIOUS IDEA 4–5 (2010) (discussing the transformative and all-consuming nature of Darwin’s 
universal acid). 
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creatures—are merely “memes” that cause certain neurons to fire.103 Thus, 
there is no intentionality and no “law.” 
II.  A PHILOSOPHICAL GENEALOGY OF REDUCTIVE NEUROLAW 
A. Law, Means, and Ends 
The drive to make the law “scientific” is not in the first instance the result 
of any empirical observations of evolutionary biology or neuroscience. Rather, 
it is rooted in the broader intellectual movement towards legal positivism and 
instrumentalism. In his insightful book Law as a Means to an End, Brian 
Tamanaha describes the shift in Anglo-American law towards legal 
instrumentalism starting in the nineteenth century.104 Tamanaha traces how 
“law” in the West became unmoored from any transcendent source and began 
to occupy the place of a “science.” He explains that: 
Science is oriented toward uncovering causal relations, effects and functions, 
formulated in terms of principles or laws. Non-instrumental views portrayed 
law as an immanent ordering (of the universe or of the community). Under a 
scientific view, law would come instead to be seen as the source of social 
order—to produce social order is the function or purpose or end of law. In turn, 
this new perspective, over time, would open up questions about the efficiency 
and utility of law in carrying out its functions. The subtle but fundamental 
difference can be put thus: law is order, versus law maintains order."105 
Tamanaha notes that in the Anglo-American legal tradition, historically, 
“law was not seen as an empty vessel that could be filled in with whatever 
content might be desired by law makers to serve whatever end was desired.”106 
There were various theories of legal legitimacy, including “natural law, 
principle and reason, or customs from time immemorial,” all of which finally 
located law in some transcendent source.107 But, according to Tamanaha, a 
variety of intellectual currents, including Spencerian Social Darwinism, laisez 
faire economics, and Benthamite utilitarianism, contributed to the rise of “legal 
positivism” throughout the nineteenth century.108 Legal positivism is a form of 
“command” theory of law, in which the law is simply whatever the authority 
with the power to enforce it says it is.109 Legal positivism is readily twinned 
with legal instrumentalism, which understands the law as a tool for achieving 
 
 103. GRAZIANO, supra note 100, at 150–58. 
 104. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 5 (2006). 
 105. Id. at 21. 
 106. Id. at 35. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 38–43. 
 109. TAMANAHA, supra note 104, at 43. 
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ends that are essentially infinitely malleable.110 Thus the law becomes severed 
from any transcendent source beyond the chosen instrumental ends instantiated 
in the will of whoever has the power to enforce the law. 
B. Law, Power, and Will 
Tamanaha’s genealogy of legal positivism is helpful, but in fact the roots 
of the drive towards “scientific” law run deeper than the scientific revolution 
and the Enlightenment. They reach deep into theological movements of the 
late medieval scholastic period, particularly nominalism, voluntarism, and the 
move towards a univocal understanding of God’s being.111 
As historian Brad Gregory notes, “[T]he alleged incompatibility between 
science and religion derives not from science but in the first instance from a 
seemingly arcane metaphysical presupposition of some medieval scholastic 
thinkers.”112 This metaphysical presupposition was that God shares being with 
creation (a “univocity of being” between God and creation); that God’s will is 
radically non-contingent, including on God’s essential nature or being; and that 
God’s providence, including his governance of creation, because of its radical 
non-contingency, was arbitrary.113 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., AMOS FUNKENSTEIN, THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENTIFIC IMAGINATION 57 
(1986) (explaining that the Nominalists and Scholasticists of the fourteenth century objected to 
any equivocation); MICHAEL ALLEN GILLESPIE, THE THEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF MODERNITY 35 
(2008) (noting that modern science developed out of nominalism); BRAD S. GREGORY, THE 
UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 32–73 
(2012) (discussing how seventeenth-century contributions by developments in scholastic 
philosophy led to the appropriation and transformation of metaphysical univocity by nominalist 
thinkers). 
 112. GREGORY, supra note 111, at 33. 
 113. Id. at 33–37; GILLESPIE, supra note 111, at 23; Catherine Pickstock, Duns Scotus: His 
Historical and Contemporary Significance, 21 MODERN THEOLOGY 543, 557–58 (2005). It 
should be noted that this rather simple account of these medieval theologians, and particularly of 
the thought and influence of Duns Scotus, has been hotly contested. See, e.g., John Hare, Scotus 
on Morality and Nature, 9 MEDIEVAL PHIL. & THEOLOGY 15, 35–38 (2000) (delineating three 
objections that eudaimonists have with Duns Scotus’s positions); Editors’ Introduction: John 
Duns Scotus and Modern Theology, 21 MODERN THEOLOGY 539, 539–40 (2005) (introducing 
Duns Scotus’s view of the univocal concept of being and the scholarly debate that follow); 
Olivier Boulnois, Reading Duns Scotus: From History to Philosophy, 21 MODERN THEOLOGY 
603, 604–05 (2005) (explaining the ways in which the author disagrees with Duns Scotus’s 
philosophy). As Hare and others argue, it may be that Scotus used the language of univocity in 
recognition of the limits of human language, while continuing to hold that God was ontologically 
entirely transcendent of creation. See id. (noting God’s transcendence within human intelligence). 
See also Thomas Williams, The Doctrine of Univocity is True and Salutary, 21 MODERN 
THEOLOGY 575, 577, 582–83 (2005) (disagreeing with the charge that Duns Scotus’s doctrine of 
univocity destroys the transcendent uniqueness of God); Nelson H. Minnich et al., Forum Essay, 
in 98 CATHOLIC HISTORICAL REVIEW 503, 508 (2012) (comments of Joshua Benson reviewing 
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If God’s will was arbitrary, then it could be known only by revelation and 
not by reason, and likewise nature could only be known by empirical 
investigation of natural phenomena and not by abstract reasoning about the 
relations between transcendent universals and immanent particulars.114 
Nominalist theologian William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) is known today for 
“Ockham’s Razor,” which is interpreted in contemporary discourse as a 
general principle of parsimony in theorizing about natural phenomena.115 
Ockham’s Razor, however, originally was directed at excessive speculation 
about transcendent universals.116 
If God’s being was univocal with the being of creation, the “need” for God 
as a causal agent diminished.117 Because of the increasing loss of a sense of 
God’s absolute transcendence over creation, prompted at least in part by 
Scholastic nominalism and voluntarism, the physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace 
(1749–1827) could eventually (reportedly) exclaim that he had no need of God 
as a “hypothesis” in assessing natural causation.118 Further, Laplace argued 
that nominalist scientific empiricism should be applied to law and politics: 
“Let us apply to the political and moral sciences the method founded upon 
 
BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION (2012)) (critiquing and briefly 
summarizing Duns Scotus’s doctrine of univocity). Nevertheless, this sort of language had 
consequences as it filtered through the Reformation and the Enlightenment. See id. at 513 
(response of Brad S. Gregory). As Gregory argues: 
Even if we follow those interpreters [of Scotus] who, as Benson indicates, regard Scotus’s 
conception of being as a semantic theory of religious language rather than an ontology, it 
would at most qualify the character of Scotus’s contribution . . . . A more adequate 
account would then inquire about the process whereby Scotus’s semantic theory was 
taken as a metaphysics such that God and creation were conceived ontological as (infinite 
and finite) differentiations within the more encompassing reality of being . . . . For, 
whatever the particularities of the history, it seems clear not only that this happened, but 
also that, in combination with Occam’s razor applied to an either/or distinction between 
natural and supernatural causality, it explains why so many scholars and scientists today 
mistakenly assume that central claims of revealed religion are rendered implausible in 
proportion as scientific explanation of natural regularities proceeds apace. 
Id. at 513. For a balanced discussion of the role of Scotus in relation to Aristotelian/Thomistic 
virtue ethics, see Porter, supra note 99, at 89 (explaining that Duns Scotus, unlike Aquinas, did 
not believe that the soul is really distinct from its faculties. Further, unlike Aristotle, Duns Scotus 
did not value the concept of virtue ethics as highly). 
 114. Gillespie, supra note 111, at 23. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. CARL B. BOYER, A HISTORY OF MATHEMATICS 494 (2d ed. 1991). In fact, this account 
of Laplace’s comments might be apocryphal, but nevertheless it was widely repeated and became 
part of the intellectual milieu in which “science” and “faith” came to be viewed as separate, and 
competing, domains. See, e.g., FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY 30 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott 
Appleby eds., 1997). 
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observation and upon calculus, the method which has served us so well in the 
natural sciences.”119 
Political philosopher Jean Bethke Elshtain suggests that the rule of law was 
ultimately weakened by these trends. In her Gifford lectures, Elshtain noted 
how the nominalistic sense of will, power, justice, and law has informed 
Western concepts of political sovereignty since the late Middle Ages: 
  If there is a vital move in theology, law, and ethics with nominalism, it is 
this: An emphasis on the primacy of will over intellect is lodged as the 
gravamen of understandings of power and authority—a seismic shift from 
realist emphases. Within medieval realism, even as Jesus, the Mediator, help 
us to “rise to him,” as Augustine puts it, so an enduring fabric and structure of 
unchanging law forges a connection between God and human beings. Human 
reason has access to it and can come to know and to embrace law freely. The 
grounding of ethics lies in law. There is an element of predictability here: You 
can “take it to the bank,” as we nowadays say.120 
Elshtain connects this nominalist tendency with legal positivism: 
  By contrast, the rise of a command-obedience account of law, what in 
modernity came to be called legal positivism, turned, at least in its early 
formulations, on the theory of a willful supreme being who might as well have 
created things differently than he did—and might yet do so by undoing what 
has been done. . . . 
  Remaining on the trail of the will in theology and politics—the voluntarist 
tendency—earthly sovereignty is to social, political, and religious life as God’s 
sovereignty is to the emergence of law and dominion in the first instance.121 
Here is the trace of Jacques Derrida’s argument about the founding event of 
justice and law as always an act of violence.122 If the founding event of God’s 
justice, the giving of the law in the Garden, is just an arbitrary act of will—a 
rule that God could change at any moment—then the same can be said of the 
human exercise of authority as derived from God. Elshtain notes: 
In strong articulations of the voluntarist theory, God holds the potential power 
in reserve—power as absoluta—and possesses the latent power to alter prior 
revelations of divine law and natural law as reason-based in favor of an 
alternative command structure. . . . 
 
 119. PIERRE SIMON & MARQUIS DE LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY ON PROBABILITIES 
107–08 (Frederick W. Truscott & Frederick L. Emory trans., 1902). 
 120. JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, SOVEREIGNTY: GOD, STATE, AND SELF 50 (2008). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 920, 925–27 (1990). 
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  The “sovereign” or ruler, whether pontiff, emperor, or king, might be 
understood to be above the law and not beholden to it lest he choose to be so 
. . . .123 
As God was elided from the equations of law and justice, first the absolute 
human sovereign, and then autonomous self, and then the irrational self, and 
finally the mercilessly deterministic brain began to take His place. 
C. Law and the Bad Man 
The voluntarist notion that law is reducible to power and will is reflected in 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s influential essay The Path of the Law, 
delivered at the opening of a new Boston University Law School hall and 
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1897.124 Holmes’s essay is so 
important that it occupies the opening slot in David Kennedy and William 
Fisher’s compilation of The Canon of American Legal Thought.125 
Holmes opens his essay with the claim that “[w]hen we study law we are 
not studying a mystery but a well known profession.”126 From the study of 
precedent—the “oracles of the law”—Holmes argued, the law student can 
discern the nature of legal duties.127 A legal duty is not a moral idea, but rather 
“is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will be 
 
 123. ELSHTAIN, supra note 120, at 50–51. But see HEIKO AUGUSTINUS OBERMAN, THE 
HARVEST OF MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY 96–98 (The Labyrinth Press 3d ed. 1983). Oberman notes 
that, in the voluntarist thought of Ockham’s disciple, Gabriel Biel, “God does not will something 
because it is good or right. If this were the case, God’s will would be subject to created principles 
of morality, whereas Biel is convinced that nothing can be called good unless it be accepted as 
such by the ‘uncreated principle,’ God.” Id. at 96. Moreover, for Biel, “God can do something 
which he himself has declared unjust; however, if he does it, it then becomes right; therefore the 
will of God is the first rule of all justice.” Id. Nevertheless, Oberman notes that Biel did not 
radically separate God’s will from God’s being, but rather that Biel attempted to preserve divine 
simplicity by rejecting distinctions between God’s will and being. Id. at 99. In so doing, Oberman 
argues, Biel preserved a notion of natural law as a stable, universal principle, albeit in a form 
somewhat different from Thomas Aquinas, particularly in the possibility that God might 
temporarily suspend some of His commandments. Id. at 110. Nevertheless, for Biel, “Insofar as 
the wisdom of God which is involved in the establishment of the natural law is beyond human 
intellectual capacities, it would have been possible for God to have decided in favor of a natural 
law different from the present one.” Id. at 100. The present natural law exists de facto because 
God has in His inscrutable wisdom made it so. Id. This seems to introduce an uncomfortable 
possible division between God’s being and His will. Brad Gregory suggests that Oberman’s 
assessment of nominalism is excessively sanguine because of Oberman’s personal disdain for 
Thomism. GREGORY, supra note 111, at 401 n.30. 
 124. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897). 
 125. THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III 
eds., 2006). 
 126. Holmes, supra note 124. 
 127. Id. at 457–58. 
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made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court.”128 The law exists 
to deter the “bad man,” for “[a] man who cares nothing for an ethical rule 
which is believed and practised by his neighbors is likely nevertheless to care a 
good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want to keep out of jail 
if he can.”129 Therefore, Holmes told the newly matriculated Boston University 
law students: 
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, 
who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables 
him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether 
inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.130 
The law in esse, for Holmes, had nothing to do with morality. Indeed, only 
“confusion of thought” could result from any equation of law and morality.131 
Instead, Holmes wondered aloud “whether it would not be a gain if every word 
of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other 
words adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside 
the law.”132 If this were possible, Holmes mused, judges might better 
understand their role as social engineers.133 Indeed, Holmes looked “forward to 
a time when the part played by history in the explanation of [legal] dogma 
shall be very small, and instead of ingenious research we shall spend our 
energy on a study of the ends sought to be attained and the reasons for desiring 
them.”134 
A key “step towards that ideal” for Holmes was “that every lawyer ought 
to seek an understanding of economics.”135 Holmes concluded his germinal 
essay with a nod to the form of practical reason that underwrote his 
philosophy: “Read the works of the great German jurists,” Holmes advised, 
“and see how much more the world is governed to-day by Kant than by 
Bonaparte.”136 There were no choices for Holmes other than the seemingly 
opposite poles of rational freedom and dictatorial tyranny. 
There is a profound irony here that seems to escape neuroLaw scholars 
such as David Eagleman. Justice Holmes wrote the infamous U.S. Supreme 
Court opinion in Buck v. Bell, a 1927 case that upheld the forced sterilization 
of mentally retarded persons.137 In that case, Holmes wrote that: 
 
 128. Id. at 458. 
 129. Id. at 459. 
 130. Id. at 459. 
 131. Holmes, supra note 124, at 460. 
 132. Id. at 464. 
 133. See id. at 467–68 (stating, “I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to 
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”). 
 134. Id. at 474. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Holmes, supra note 124, at 478. 
 137. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 204 (1927). 
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We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to 
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, 
society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. 
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover 
cutting the Fallopian tubes.138 
The climactic line of Holmes’s opinion in Buck v. Bell is widely regarded as 
one of the most embarrassing in the history of U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence: “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”139 
D. From the Bad Man to Homo Economicus to Homo Irrationaliblis 
In the contemporary history of American legal thought, this conjoining of 
legal positivism and legal instrumentalism has tended to break into two 
sometimes contradictory streams: the law and economics movement and 
critical legal studies (CLS).140 Law and economics seeks to explain legal rules 
in terms of microeconomic principles.141 CLS seeks to explain legal rules by 
deconstructing the power relations behind the rules.142 CLS can be critical, 
indeed hostile, to law and economics, but in some ways they are natural 
bedfellows. It is law and economics, after all, that supplies the notion of 
“capture,” which shows how most regulatory requirements result from the 
influence of power industries that influence (“capture”) the regulators.143 
But law and economics, following Holmes’s Kantian bent, purports to 
offer a “scientific” analysis of legal rules that can supply an objective basis for 
policymaking.144 Perhaps for this reason, over the past twenty-five years or so, 
law and economics has been a reigning paradigm for legal scholarship, while 
CLS has declined except among pockets of diehard adherents (often among 
dispossessed groups such as racial minorities, women, and the LGBT 
community).145 To be sure, there are other very important paradigms in the 
legal academy that eschew the positivism behind both law and economics and 
 
 138. Id. at 207. 
 139. Id. 
 140. THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 125, at 7; Peter Fitzpatrick & 
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CLS, notably deontological approaches informed in one way or another by 
John Rawls.146 Nevertheless, law and economics continues to represent a 
default “scientific” posture for many legal scholars.147 
In recent years, however, the law and economics movement has witnessed 
a significant shift occasioned by the rise of behavioral economics.148 Classical 
microeconomics assumes rational utility-maximizing actors who act on perfect 
information, a model which even neoclassical economists admit almost never 
obtains in the real world.149 Behavioral economics, in contrast, assumes that 
people do things for reasons that are often irrational or sub-rational.150 This 
assumption is informed by empirical behavioral psychology studies.151 And 
 
 146. It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a critique of Rawlsian legal theory. In short, 
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behavioral economics has spawned a robust new sub-discipline of behavioral 
law and economics.152 
Behavioral law and economics scholarship can offer useful and interesting 
insights concerning the limitations of rational choice theory for legal 
analysis.153 Critics have argued, however, that the experiments upon which 
behavioral economics is based are not transposable to real-world market 
situations.154 Here reductive neuroLaw enters the stage. The supposedly harder 
science of neurobiology—“harder” precisely because it is a natural science 
rather than a social science—might confirm the behavioral economists’ insight 
that human beings are finally not rational beings. Could neuroLaw finally 
fulfill Holmes’s Kantian dream? 
III.  DECONSTRUCTING REDUCTIVE NEUROLAW 
A. The Naked Power of Law Without Reasons 
If neuroLaw is truly to fulfill its promise, why doesn’t an ardent believer 
such as David Eagleman go all-in for lobotomies, chemical castrations, and 
other more direct biological interventions? “The ethical problem,” Eagleman 
suggests, “pivots on how much a state should be able to change its citizens.”155 
This is a “landmark problem” in neuroscience: “[A]s we come to understand 
the brain, how can we keep governments from meddling with it?”156 One of 
Eagleman’s concerns is that legal advances of recent years, such as civil rights 
legislation, should not be compromised: “Our social policies work to cement 
into place the most enlightened ideas of humanity to surmount the basest facets 
of human nature.”157 
Eagleman never explains what terms like “should” or “meddling” or 
“enlightened” or “surmount” or “basest facets” might mean in his neuro-world. 
Nor does he venture any suggestion about why some behaviors should qualify 
for a prefrontal workout while others ought to be left unchecked or 
encouraged. In a world without transcendence, why should one organism’s 
immanent frame be preferred over another’s? Eagleman recites notorious 
examples of pedophiles and mass murderers whose conduct clearly was 
influenced by significant brain traumas or invasive tumors.158 What makes 
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their brain states or their conduct abnormal and therefore subject to correction? 
Why ought “governments” not possess the power to meddle with citizens’ 
brain states? In an evolving sociobiological matrix, there are no “neural rights” 
(a term Eagleman inexplicably introduces and then drops);159 there are only 
game-theoretic solutions for passing along genes. 
To move from extreme examples such as pedophiles and mass murderers, 
consider a society in which people who hold undesirable ideas and engage in 
other anti-social practices—say, rallies and demonstrations for political or 
religious causes opposed by the majority of the populace—are sent to 
reeducation camps for prefrontal workouts. To refine the example, let us admit 
that people are not in fact created equal, and that the task of determining which 
rallies and demonstrations are anti-social is taken on by an elite class specially 
bred for this task. Visions of Aryan supremacy, Communist China during the 
Cultural Revolution, contemporary North Korea, and Orwell’s “1984” are not 
far off. These are not new ideas, dressed up though they may be in the trendy 
lingo of neuroscience. 
Eagleman, to be fair, is not advocating a neuroscientific totalitarian state, 
but there appears to be no reason why not. There simply is no basis in 
neuroscience for his expressed preference of liberal democratic values or for 
any other notion of human dignity inscribed in the law. Having given up on a 
meaningful notion of persons and agency, he destroys the basis for 
understanding “human equality” as something that transcends differences in 
mental capacity. 
Indeed, Eagleman at times seems uncomfortable with his own logic. In an 
effort to critique any concept of an immaterial soul—which he refers to as “the 
extrabiological soul”—he rehearses various examples of how brain states, 
chemical alterations (such as cocaine) and brain injuries can affect behavior, 
and concludes that “invisibly small molecules we call narcotics, 
neurotransmitters, hormones, viruses, and genes can place their little hands on 
the steering wheel of our behavior.”160 Quoting neuroethicist Martha Farah, he 
asks: 
[I]f an antidepressant pill ‘can help us take everyday problems in stride, and if 
a stimulant can help us meet our deadlines and keep our commitments at work, 
then must not unflappable temperaments and conscientious characters also be 
features of people’s bodies? And if so, is there anything about people that is 
not a feature of their bodies?’161 
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 160. EAGLEMAN, supra note 16, at 208–09. 
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“If there’s something like a soul,” Eagleman says, “it is at minimum 
tangled irreversibly with the microscopic details.”162 “From this point of 
view,” he notes, “you can see why biological reductionism has a strong 
foothold in modern brain science.”163 
But then, remarkably, Eagleman undermines his entire thesis with a 
critique of reductionism based on emergence.164 Reductionism, he says, “isn’t 
the whole story.”165 He critiques the sort of genetic reductionism that drove the 
Human Genome Project and concludes that “successive levels of reduction are 
doomed to tell us very little about the questions important to humans.”166 He 
nods towards systems biology by noting that “the contributions from the 
genome can really be understood only in the context of interaction with the 
environment” and argues that “knowledge of the genes alone is not sufficient 
to tell you much about behavior.”167 He offers the example of reducing an 
airplane to a hunk of metal, and concludes that “[t]he concept of emergent 
properties means that something new can be introduced that is not inherent in 
any of the parts.”168 
So much for the way Eagleman initially framed the “crux of the question” 
concerning law and responsibility: he apparently agrees that there can be a 
meaningful concept of will and responsibility that need not propose a mind 
“independent of the biology.”169 Indeed, he agrees that will and responsibility 
need not even emerge from the brain alone: “Without a doubt,” he says, 
“minds and biology are connected—but not in a manner that we’ll have any 
hope of understanding with a purely reductionist approach.”170 And later he 
concludes “[w]hen we talk about ‘the brain’ and behavior, this is a shorthand 
label for something that includes contributions from a much broader 
sociobiological system. The brain is not so much the seat of the mind as the 
hub of the mind.”171After this statement, it is hard to comprehend what all the 
fuss is about. It seems, then, that Eagleman wants it both ways: he wants 
neuroscience to replace notions of agency and culpability, but at the same time 
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he wants to speak holistically of things like “desire,” “friendship,” “trust,” 
“people,” and “families.”172 
In fact, Eagleman’s approach is question-begging on multiple fronts. First, 
Eagleman assumes that any part of the brain that is “free” to choose must 
comprise a “little bit.”173 But what is meant by “little”? Throughout his book, 
Eagleman gives examples that suggest the brain is comprised of multiple 
independent control systems that operate below conscious awareness.174 He 
argues that what we call “consciousness” is a sort of executive control module 
that becomes active when circumstances require mediation between the 
subconscious control systems—a situation that, in quantitative terms, 
represents a small portion of our overall brain function.175 It appears, then, that 
Eagleman’s term “little bit” is quantitative: only a small portion of our waking 
brain activity may be dedicated to conscious decision-making.176 This may be 
true, but Eagleman simply begs the question whether the qualitative aspects of 
the activity he assigns to conscious decision-making are a “big bit” of what we 
mean by “consciousness” and “responsibility.” 
The realization that human beings conduct many of their daily activities in 
an automatic or subconscious mode is not a new insight of neuroscience. 
Eagleman averts to this when he acknowledges that “[t]he existence of free 
will in human behavior is the subject of an ancient and heated debate.”177 
Indeed! Yet he never even attempts to explore the contours of that debate. A 
key problem in that debate is the phenomenological observation, known from 
ancient times, that human beings often act automatically, under apparent 
mental compulsion, or otherwise outside the zone of conscious control.178 
What contemporary neuroscience brings to the table is a deeper understanding 
of the physical element of at least some of these phenomena. 
In fact, such a focus on habits and practices is precisely what virtue theory, 
which informs many kinds of moral theology, is all about.179 Moral theologians 
and philosophers, however, will want to inquire about the development of the 
habit itself.180 Is not the “largest bit” of the story, from a qualitative 
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perspective, the initial development of habits and practices, through some 
exercise of the conscious will, that lead to habituated action? Far from 
undermining traditional accounts of moral action, then, neuroscience simply 
fleshes out the physical picture of what theology and philosophy already knew: 
behaviors become ingrained in the “soul” and changing them requires 
prolonged and sometimes difficult habituation into new behaviors. 
B. Evolving Norms and Fitness Landscapes 
Eagleman’s proposal also suffers from a lack of normative grounding. In 
an evolving universe, taken solely on its own terms, there is no normative force 
to the term “normal.” There are populations, which always exhibit some degree 
of genetic diversity, and there is change over time. There is no sense in which 
organisms should conform to any “norm” external to survival in the context of 
the selective pressures on the organism. Perhaps a rough analogy to a “norm” 
would be a species’s fitness landscape—that is, the parameters of the 
environment the species inhabits.181 The notion is that natural selection will 
direct a population toward the mean fitness level as determined by the 
organism’s environment.182 
Let us return to Ian Tattersall’s reference to the normal distribution. We 
could imagine a statistical normal distribution in which the mean fitness level 
represents what Eagleman means by “normal” behavior. This is a great leap of 
imagination given the complexity of human behavioral interactions (can “a 
behavior” even be isolated from other behaviors?), but nevertheless we shall 
simplify for the sake of discussion. In a normal distribution, more than twenty-
five percent of the set falls between one and two standard deviations from the 
mean, as illustrated below:183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 181. See MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION 216 (3d ed. 2004) (“When the environment changed, 
and competing species evolved new forms, the shape of the adaptive topography for a population 
would change too.”). 
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Would Eagleman propose that twenty-five percent of the population be 
assigned to reeducation camps for prefrontal workouts? In the United States, 
this would encompass about seventy-nine million people.184 According to the 
U.S. Census Bureau, over 1.6 million people were incarcerated in State and 
Federal prisons in the United States as of 2009.185 Extending Eagleman’s 
cognitive workout program to people beyond one standard deviation of the 
mean therefore would represent a massive expansion of the criminal justice 
system, without precedent in world history. Or, perhaps, Eagleman would 
require cognitive workouts for only the roughly two percent who fall on the 
tails outside two standard deviations of the mean? This would cover about 6.8 
million people in the United States—about six times the number now 
incarcerated.186 Who would decide where to draw this line? Do the sixty-eight 
percent within one standard deviation of the mean get to decide, or the ninety-
five percent within two standard deviations? 
A significant problem here—which is also a problem with Tattersall’s 
reference to the normal distribution—is that, in strictly evolutionary terms, 
particularly in terms of the concept of fitness landscapes, it is doubtful whether 
there is any such thing as a homogenous normal distribution.187 Biologists who 
favor the idea of fitness landscapes distinguish between “global” and “local” 
landscapes, and argue that segments of a broader population can move toward 
a fitness mean dictated by local niche conditions, which might represent a 
different mean than that of the aggregate population.188 The resulting picture is 
more like a set of hills and valleys rather than a single normal distribution:189 
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So what might the fitness landscape look like for human social behaviors? 
Would there be local populations in which optimal behaviors include things 
like forced marriage of young girls, slavery, and spousal abuse? It seems there 
would be, or else such behaviors would not recur so often throughout human 
history. Within such populations, presumably there would be no need for 
cognitive workouts to correct such behavior. If anything, people who fall a 
standard deviation or two outside this local mean (such as, perhaps, some 
brave young woman who desired independence and an education) would be 
candidates for reeducation. Curiously, this might indeed describe the 
socialization process for young girls in some contemporary societies that blend 
tribalism with radical Islamism (the Taliban). 
Biologist and new atheist popularizer Sam Harris tackled precisely the 
problem of the treatment of women in radical Islamist societies in an audacious 
TED talk, entitled “Science Can Answer Moral Questions.”190 Early in his talk, 
consistent with Eagleman, Harris claims that “a suicide bomber’s ‘personality 
. . . is the product of his brain.”191 Yet, later, he flashes a picture of a woman 
wearing a burqa and claims that everyone in his audience knows it is unhealthy 
and bad for this woman to be forced to wear a burqa “involuntarily.’”192 But is 
the woman’s choice to wear the burqa, or her compliance with the social norm 
that impels her to wear the burqa, not a product of her brain? And does the 
tradition of burqa-wearing not reflect something about social strategies in the 
fitness landscape of Islamic societies, with deep historical roots in the cultural 
dress practices of the ancient near east? Why should Harris’s historically recent 
Western liberal democratic values trump the survival strategies of the near 
eastern societies in which the burqa is valued? 
Still later in his talk, Harris critiques the culture of girlie magazines in the 
West.193 He asks, “Is this the optimal environment in which to raise our 
children?”194 Well, who is to say? If the women who pose get paid, and the 
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men who peek get off, and the publishers and writers and newsstand owners 
make money, are we not observing an optimal fitness maximization strategy? 
The production and use of sexualized female imagery is among the most 
ancient of human arts, which suggests from an ecological anthropology 
perspective that such behavior serves some adaptive purpose.195 
IV.  A KINDER, GENTLER NEUROLAW? 
A. Hominization and the Law 
The history of human evolution in the supposed state of pure nature, 
unfortunately for the project of reductive neuroLaw, is deeply ambiguous. 
Purely immanent “law” turns out either to affirm every behavior or to draw 
entirely arbitrary lines among behaviors. Perhaps for this reason, it seems that 
a transcendent concept of “law” is a human universal. Every human culture in 
recorded history has some concept of transcendent principles that were 
translated into some concept of justice and positive law.196 It seems that we are 
homo juridicus—we cannot help but express particular legal norms for our 
communal relations based on some higher governing principles. And the 
capacity to formulate “law” seems uniquely human. David Sloan Wilson’s 
microbes have no law, nor do chimps or dolphins formulate codes of positive 
law or conceive (as far as we know) of a higher law, nor do we have any 
record of law codes among any of the hominid species that preceded us. 
The reference to “recorded history” in relation to law is important because 
positive law, by definition, implies a record.197 The oldest law code discovered 
by archaeologists is that of Ur-Nammu, ruler of the city of Ur during its third 
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dynasty, which began in about 2050 B.C.198 The tablet containing Ur-
Nammu’s laws dates to about three hundred years before Hammurabi created 
the code that was inscribed on a famous stele now on display in the Louvre.199 
One side of the tablet containing Ur-Nammu’s law code locates the origin 
of the laws in a creation myth.200 The chief gods An and Enlil appointed the 
moon-god Nanna to rule over Ur, and Nanna in turn selected Ur-Nammu as 
their human representative.201 Ur-Nammu removed the “chiselers” and 
“grabbers,” people who stole the citizen’s oxen, sheep, and donkeys, from the 
city.202 He established a system of weights and measures and ensured equity 
for the poor and dispossessed.203 By his rule he ensured that “the orphan did 
not fall a prey to the wealthy,” “the widow did not fall a prey to the powerful,” 
and “the man of one shekel did not fall a prey to the man of one mina (sixty 
shekels).”204 
The other side of the tablet lists Ur-Nammu’s laws. The tablet is badly 
damaged and only five of the laws are readily discernible.205 These show that 
the lex talonis already had been mitigated through a system of monetary 
payments. Thus, if a man cut off another man’s foot with some sort of 
instrument (the text is unclear about what kind of instrument), he was liable for 
damages of ten silver shekels; a severed nose required damages of two thirds 
of a silver mina (forty silver shekels).206 
Ur-Nammu certainly was not the first law-giver. Indeed, there are 
references dating about three-hundred years before the Ur-Nammu law tablet 
to the legal reforms of Urukagina, ruler of the city of Lagash.207 According to 
an inscription memorializing Urukagina, he “freed the inhabitants of Lagash 
from usury, burdensome controls, hunger, theft, murder, and seizure (of their 
property and persons). He established freedom (of a type). The widow and 
orphan were no longer at the mercy of the powerful: it was for them that 
Urukagina made his covenant with Ningirsu.”208 All of these references show 
that concepts of justice, the rule of law, and written law codes date at least to 
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the foundations of the earliest Mesopotamian cities. Perhaps the inscribing of 
positive law is as old as writing itself.209 
We know nothing of “law” prior to recorded history. But if Mithen’s 
theory is correct, the cognitive connections that facilitated art, science, and 
religion also would have facilitated concepts of “law”—and the lack of such 
connections would have meant that for early hominids/humans, there was no 
“law.” And if Tattersall is correct, the acquisition of language would also have 
facilitated the concept of law, particularly positive law with its concrete 
expression in language. 
The earliest small bands of hunter-gatherer hominids/humans, of course, 
would have operated according to sets of social “rules.”210 Social rules are not 
a uniquely human trait. Indeed, social ordering is a pervasive feature of the 
animal kingdom. Even insects, such as honeybees, can show intricate social 
ordering.211 “Dumb” farm animals, such as the chickens I have begun raising 
in my backyard, are socially strict creatures—hence the term “pecking 
order.”212 Other higher mammals, such as whales, dolphins, and elephants, 
display detailed social ordering with local cultural variations.213 Modern 
chimpanzee bands possess elaborate cultural norms that regulate access to 
food, access to sex, access to affection, and even what we might 
anthropomorphically call “war” with other tribes.214 Observations of 
chimpanzee and bonobo social ordering provide the raw material for many 
game-theoretic studies of human evolutionary psychology.215 
But it seems clear that even the most socially “advanced” of the higher 
mammals do not possess concepts of social order closely akin to what we call 
“law.” A dominant animal in the pack might perform a sort of “judicial” 
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function by forcibly ending disputes, but there is nothing like a well-defined 
set of juridical procedures or principles. Most significantly, even these highest 
of social mammals appear to have no concept of binding abstract principles 
that would support a “rule of law.” The “law” for them finally is, literally, the 
“law of the jungle”—chemistry, instinct, material and reproductive advantage, 
and force. 
If we humans know a concept of “law” that refers the “legitimate” rule of 
law to abstract principles—indeed if we know even a concept of 
“legitimacy”—this requires a sort of cognitive capacity that only we humans, 
of all the creatures on Earth, seem to possess. Could it be that the same 
cognitive breakthroughs that facilitated the creative explosion in language, art, 
technology, and religion also were necessary to the development of “law”? 
Indeed, could it be that an essential part of what marks us “human” is just this 
sense of transcendent “law”? 
B. Chastened NeuroLaw and Legal Constructivism 
Contrary to Eagleman and Harris, some neuroLaw scholars recognize the 
need for caution when reframing concepts of positive law, particularly in light 
of the extravagant possibilities seemingly opened up by neuroscience. Stephen 
J. Morse, a law professor and Associate Director of the Center of Neuroscience 
and Society at the University of Pennsylvania, asks “why so many enthusiasts 
seem to have extravagant expectations about the contributions of neuroscience 
to law, especially criminal law.”216 Morse suggests that: 
Many people intensely dislike the concept and practice of retributive justice, 
thinking that they are prescientific and harsh. Their hope is that the new 
neuroscience will convince the law at last that determinism is true, no offender 
is genuinely responsible, and the only logical conclusion is that the law should 
adopt a consequentially based prediction/ prevention system of social control 
guided by the knowledge of the neuroscientist-kings who will finally have 
supplanted the platonic philosopher-kings.217 
More careful neuroLaw scholars recognize some of the problems with 
reductionism. As Morse notes: 
[T]he arguments and evidence that [reductive neuroLaw scholars] use to 
convince others presuppose the folk-psychological view of the person. Brains 
do not convince each other, people do. Folk psychology presupposes only that 
human action will at least be rationalizable by mental state explanations or will 
be response to reasons—including incentives—under the right conditions.218 
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Morse notes that “[t]he legal view of the person does not hold that people 
must always reason or consistently behave rationally according to some 
preordained, normative notion of rationality.”219 Instead, he argues, the law 
requires only that people be capable of “minimal rationality according to 
predominantly conventional, socially constructed standards.”220 Such a notion 
of minimal rationality is important because law governs people, not machines: 
Machines may cause harm, but they cannot do wrong, and they cannot violate 
expectations about how people ought to live together. Machines do not deserve 
praise, blame, reward, punishment, concern, or respect because they exist or 
because of the results they cause. Only people, intentional agents with the 
potential to act, can do wrong and violate expectations of what they owe each 
other.221 
“If human beings were not rational creatures who could understand the good 
reasons for action and were not capable of conforming to legal requirements 
through intentional action or forbearance,” Morse reminds us, “the law could 
not adequately guide action and would not be just.”222 
Nevertheless, Morse argues that even if neuroscience destroys any concept 
of human free will, this would not matter one bit for legal doctrine.223 Morse 
argues that “[c]riminal law doctrines are fully consistent with the truth of 
determinism or universal causation that allegedly undermines the foundations 
of responsibility. Even if determinism is true, some people act and some 
people do not.”224 
In one sense, Morse is correct. A society could continue to employ legal 
doctrines that govern behaviors even if those behaviors are unfree. And even 
where legal doctrines govern mental states—such as the mens rea requirement 
in criminal law—the law could define those states with reference to the 
absence of certain kinds of constraints on action, such as unusual behavioral 
states defined as “insanity.” But what Morse does not admit is that this would 
represent a radically different concept of “law” than what has historically 
obtained in Western culture. In particular, this conception would sever the 
notion of “law” from the notion of “justice.” Why ought a society enact laws 
that discourage some behaviors and encourage others? That is a question of 
justice. Without some concept of human freedom, there is no concept of 
justice, at least not in any sense familiar to our sense of “law.” 
Later in the same article, Morse seems to recognize this conundrum. He 
notes that “[d]espite our lack of understanding of the mind-brain-action 
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relation, some scientists and philosophers question whether mental states have 
any causal effect, thus treating mental states as psychic appendixes that 
evolution has created but that have no genuine function.”225 This claim, he 
admits, is made by “serious, thoughtful people,” and if true, “would create a 
complete and revolutionary paradigm shift in the law of criminal responsibility 
and competence (and more widely).”226 Nevertheless, Morse suggests, “given 
our current state of knowledge, there is little scientific or conceptual reason to 
accept” this broader critique.227 It seems that Morse thinks some concept of 
supervenience might preserve at least some concept of intentionality that 
would underwrite some idea of rationality and justice in the law. And yet, 
Morse assures us, “Most informed people are not dualists concerning the 
relation between the mind and the brain. That is, they no longer think our 
minds—or souls—are independent of our brains and bodies more generally 
and can somehow exert a causal influence over our bodies.”228 It seems that 
Morse wants his materialist cake with Aristotelian icing. 
C. NeuroLaw and a Modernized Aristotelianism 
A few bold philosophers and legal scholars have more directly taken 
neuroLaw to task for its reductionism of “mind” to “brain.”229 Michael Pardo 
and Dennis Patterson, in their article Philosophical Foundations of Law and 
Neuroscience, observe that: 
  If anything unites the various problems and projects of neurolegalists, it is 
the belief that the mind and the brain are one. This belief has spread far beyond 
neurolegalists, for it is a pervasive feature of much of the current literature and 
research in neuroscience as well as more popular writings.230 
Yet, Pardo and Patterson ask, “[D]oes it make sense to attribute to the brain 
psychological attributes normally attributed to persons? Can we intelligibly say 
that the brain thinks, perceives, feels pain, and decides? If we cannot, what are 
the implications for neuroscience and law?”231 
Pardo and Patterson believe that the reduction of “mind” to “brain” is a 
category mistake.232 Nevertheless, they reject what they describe as the 
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“Cartesian dualism” that posits the “mind” as a separate “substance” or 
“entity.”233 Instead, they opt for a phenomenological distinction between 
“behavior, reactions, and responses of the living human being in the stream of 
life” and the “[b]rain functions and activities” that relate to these behaviors, 
reactions, and responses.234 “This is the key,” they claim, “to the mereological 
fallacy and the undoing of the reductive impulses of neurolegalists.” They 
continue: 
Behavior is something only a human being (or other animal) can engage in. 
Brain functions and activities are not behaviors (and persons are not their 
brains). Yes, it is necessary that one have a brain in order to engage in 
behavior. But the reduction of a psychological attribute to a cortical attribute is 
a fallacious move from whole to part.235 
A key aspect of Pardo and Patterson’s critique is the interpretation of the 
relation between empirical observations of brain states and specific behaviors. 
For example, Pardo and Patterson criticize a “neuroeconomics” study of 
activity in different brain regions triggered by monetary offers in an ultimatum 
game.236 The authors of the study concluded that different brain regions fire 
when the offer is perceived to be “unfair,” and suggested that legal rules 
(presumably regarding information disclosures) could be tweaked to mitigate 
bad economic choices.237 Pardo and Patterson conclude that: 
  The evidence does not support their interpretations. First, it makes no sense 
to say that the brain “decides,” “reasons,” or “adjudicates” anything. Second, 
all that the neuroscientific evidence shows with regard to the ultimatum game 
is what subjects' brains were doing while they (the subjects) were deciding 
whether to accept or reject the offer. Consider the following analogy. Suppose 
one's face turned red whenever he was angry. Now, suppose when faced with 
an unfair offer in the ultimatum game, his face turned red right before he 
rejected the offer. Surely we would not say that the person's face rejected the 
offer—why, then, conclude that his insula cortex did so because it too turned 
colors on an fMRI machine?238 
But if Pardo and Patterson reject what they consider the Cartesian-dualist 
and reductionist accounts of the mind-brain relation, what do they offer 
instead? They propose that “[t]he mind is not an entity or substance at all 
(whether non-physical or physical). To have a mind is to possess a certain 
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array of rational powers exhibited in thought, feeling, and action.”239 This 
concept, they suggest, is rooted in Aristotle. As they interpret Aristotle: 
[T]he mind is not a part of the person that causally interacts with the person's 
body. It is just the mental powers, abilities, and capacities possessed by 
humans. Likewise, the ability to see is not a part of the eye that interacts with 
other parts of the physical eye. Under this conception, the question of the 
mind's location in the body makes no sense just as the location of eyesight 
within the eye makes no sense.240 
They argue that this Aristotelian concept is “materialist/physicalist” in the 
sense that to lose the brain is also to lose the mind, but that it is nonreductive 
because “the mind is not identical with the brain.”241 And this means that, 
although neuroscience can contribute to law, it cannot overtake law.242 
Pardo and Patterson have done a great service in debunking some of the 
grander claims of neuroLaw and in introducing Aristotle back into the mix. But 
Pardo and Patterson are careful to steer away from Aristotelian notions of 
causation. They invoke Aristotle as a sort of paradigmatic example of holism 
in the mind-body relation, but without offering the context for Aristotle’s 
hylomorphism, which finally only makes sense within a thicker metaphysical 
matrix than that to which Pardo and Patterson are prepared to commit. The 
next section explores such a thicker matrix. 
D. Revitalizing a Sense of Aristotelian Causation in the Law 
In his treatise “On the Soul,” Aristotle indeed stated that the “soul” and the 
“body” are inseparable. For example, comparing the soul to the potential 
power of a cutting tool and relating it to the power of sight, Aristotle said, 
“[T]he soul is actuality in the sense corresponding to the power of sight and the 
power in the tool; the body corresponds to what exists in potentiality; as the 
pupil plus the power of sight constitutes the eye, so the soul plus the body 
constitutes the animal.”243Yet Aristotle never simply equated the soul with 
bodily functions. For example, he noted that “all those who define the soul by 
its power of knowing make it either an element or constructed out of the 
elements,” and he is keen to refute this sort of reductionism.244 Instead, for 
Aristotle, the soul is the form or source of the body: 
  The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and 
source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three 
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senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of 
movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body.245 
This reference to causation, source, and movement refers to Aristotle’s concept 
of causation. 
Aristotle recognized four kinds or aspects of causation: material, formal, 
efficient, and final.246 The material cause is that out of which something 
comes, such as the bronze of a statue.247 The formal cause is the form or 
account of what it is to be something, such as the shape of a statue.248 The 
efficient cause is the primary source of change or rest, such as the sculptor who 
chips away at the marble.249 The final cause is the end for which something is 
done, such as the production of a sculpture.250 
Modern science recognizes only efficient causes.251 While this may be an 
important methodological limitation, it is unwarranted, without further 
explanation, as an overarching metaphysic. Moreover, an Aristotelian or neo-
Aristotelian notion of “mind” (or “soul”) requires all these various senses of 
causation, and in particular final causation.252 If some sort of Aristotelian 
anthropology is a response to reductive neuroLaw, then we must speak of 
where “law” comes from, what it means for “law” to be “law,” and of the ends 
or purposes of “law.” That is, we must speak of “law” as having some 
transcendent telos, some source that also implies its ends. 
Reductive neuroLaw by definition offers no such transcendent sources or 
ends. In neuroLaw’s state of pure nature there is no procedure for deriving how 
humans “ought” to live from the “is” of neurobiology. At any moment in the 
flow of evolutionary time, it might be possible to describe a fitness landscape 
of human behaviors, with highly localized accounts of an ordinary distribution 
of behavior ranges. Yet there is no principled way to construct a legal system 
that would seek to “correct” any particular behavior along any of these 
behavioral fitness curves. The act of attempting to effect such “corrections” 
itself would simply represent another adaptive behavior. And the legal 
machinery necessary to implement such corrective action necessarily would 
imply mere force and violence. 
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Reductive neuroLaw therefore offers nothing other than the purposeless 
meander of natural selection. It is pure force—the “force of the law” without 
law. Thus, the legal system of reductive neuroLaw would perfectly enact the 
state of exception from the law.253 With no rule of law, the will of the most 
powerful persons or groups would marginalize, exclude, control, and 
eventually replace and extinguish the less powerful, until the race of humanity 
is comprised only of the master race—except that not even the promised 
master race would make its parousia, since the fitness landscape changes and 
the cycle of competition is a world without end.254 Indeed, the pure nature 
imagined by reductive neuroLaw destroys even “nature” itself. There is no 
whole “nature” that selects for its parts, and there are no parts oriented towards 
a whole. Finally, only these three remain—time, energy, and change—and the 
greatest of these is change.255 
V.  CONCLUSION: NEUROLAW AS A STATE OF EXCEPTION 
In his book Homo Sacer, Italian political philosopher Giorgio Agamben 
observes that in the state of exception the law is “suspended.”256 When faced 
with a perceived threat or emergency, the sovereign declares a “state of 
exception” under which the ordinary rules of procedure, evidence, and 
judgment no longer apply.257 In the state of exception there is no law but the 
will of the sovereign, and thus there is no “law” at all.258 
Agamben highlights the problem of the relation between constituting and 
constituted power. Constituted power is that which is exercised with an 
existing state/juridical framework.259 Constituting power is that which 
legitimates the state/juridical framework in the first instance.260 Agamben 
suggests that the problem of constitutive power “is increasingly dismissed as a 
prejudice or a merely factual matter,” creating a circularity by which the 
problem of legitimate power simply is referred to a constitutional document, 
which hangs in mid-air.261 The fundamental problem, he argues, is 
metaphysical: what is the relation between potentiality (the possibility of 
 
 253. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER 15 (1998) (discussing the state of exception from 
the law). 
 254. Cf. Ephesians 3:20–21 (King James) (“Now unto him that is able to do exceeding 
abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us, Unto him be 
glory in the church by Christ Jesus throughout all ages, world without end. Amen.”). 
 255. Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:13 (New International) (“And now these three remain: faith, hope 
and love. But the greatest of these is love.”). 
 256. AGAMBEN, supra note 253, at 17. 
 257. Id. at 15. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. at 39. 
 260. Id. at 39–40. 
 261. AGAMBEN, supra note 253, at 40. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
536 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:497 
constituting law) and actuality (law as constituted).262 “Until a new and 
coherent ontology of potentiality . . . has replaced the ontology founded on the 
primacy of actuality and its relation to potentiality,” he argues, “a political 
theory freed from the aporias of sovereignty remains unthinkable.”263 
Agamben demonstrates that this problem of constituting and constituted 
law is a manifestation of the Aristotelian relationship between potentiality and 
act, dynamis and energia.264 How, if at all, is potentiality different from act? 
Potentiality in the Aristotelian sense, Agamben explains, is the ability not to do 
or be: “Every potentiality is impotentiality of the same and with respect to the 
same” or “‘What is potential can both be and not be.’”265 This means that when 
potentiality passes into act, that which is potential “sets aside its own potential 
not to be (its adynamia).”266 Therefore it is through potentiality that “[b]eing 
founds itself sovereignly,” for the passage to actuality implies the sovereign 
freedom not to be or act.267 And this means that constituting power is never 
exhausted by constituted power. Sovereign power can remain in reserve, as 
ungiven potentiality.268 As Conor Cunningham notes, Agamben plays on the 
voluntarist notion of de potential absoluta.269 
Here Agamben explores the figure of homo sacer, the person in Roman 
law placed under the sacred ban.270 The homo sacer was not subject to 
execution by the State, but neither was it a crime of homicide for anyone to kill 
him.271 This placed the homo sacer paradoxically both under and outside the 
law. The same dynamic, Agamben notes, was obtained in the Germanic 
wargus, the “werewolf,” who is banned from the city and its law.272 Agamben 
defines this as the origin of politics: “Not simple natural life, but life exposed 
to death (bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element.”273 
Agamben thereby deconstructs the Hobbesian response to the state of 
nature: the city and its laws do not limit the violence of the state of nature, but 
rather the state of nature exists within the city, in the human condition of bare 
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life, through which the citizen may become homo sacer/wolf-man in the state 
of exception.274 The potential of the state of exception, moreover, bears within 
the potential for the dissolution of the city itself: “The transformation into a 
werewolf corresponds perfectly to the state of exception, during which 
(necessarily limited) time the city is dissolved and men enter into a zone in 
which they are no longer distinct from beasts.”275 Thus, “[t]he state of nature 
is, in truth, a state of exception, in which the city appears for an instant (which 
is at the same time a chronological interval and a nontemporal moment) 
tanquam disoluta.”276 
The paradigm of this dynamic, Agamben argues, is the concentration 
camp. In the camp, the governing “law” is pure biopolitics, the assertion of 
power over the body, as evidenced vividly in the gruesome Nazi medical 
experiments on inmates.277 “The camp,” Agamben says, “was also the most 
absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power 
confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation.”278 “Law” and “fact” 
become indistinguishable in the camp: the fact of bare life is law.279 And as 
Western politics have come to define humanity in terms of bare life, to 
perpetuate the state of exception, and thereby to declare all persons not persons 
but rather homo sacer and wargus, the camp has superceded the city as our 
basic political paradigm.280 
Agamben does not resolve this aporia, but he concludes with an appeal to 
reconstitute Western metaphysics.281 As Christian theologian Graham Ward 
has noted, Agamben makes use of Pauline thinking about the person, about 
faith and love, “but there is no analysis of the third in the Pauline trilogue of 
virtues—hope.”282 Ward adopts Agamben’s critique of the state of exception 
but only as a starting point to illuminate the contemporary situation and to 
bring it into the light of Christian eschatological hope.283 
Earlier in his essay on Homo Sacer, Agamben refers to an article by 
Emmanuel Levinas, Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.284 In that 
essay, Levinas locates the philosophy of National Socialism in “the essential 
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possibility of elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against 
which Western philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself.”285 
Within the Jewish and Christian traditions, Levinas argued, human beings 
are free to transcend the vicissitudes of history, including of their own personal 
histories.286 “This freedom,” he said, “which is infinite with regard to any 
attachment and through which no attachment is ultimately definitive, lies at the 
base of the Christian notion of the soul.”287 Although the body remains stuck in 
the slipstream of history, through renewal of the soul a person “can regain the 
nudity he had during the first days of creation.”288 Because each soul always 
retains this potential to renew itself, there remains an “equal dignity of each 
and every soul, which is independent of the material or social conditions of 
people.”289 Indeed, freedom from history is the ultimate freedom: 
The salvation that Christianity wishes to bring us lies in the way it promises to 
reopen the finality brought about by the flow of moments of a past that is 
forever challenged, forever called into question, to go beyond the absolute 
contradiction of a past that is subordinate to the present.290 
The modern alternatives to this paradigm, for Levinas, were liberalism, 
Marxism, and National Socialism.291 Each of these programs displaced the 
notion of the soul. 
For Levinas, liberalism retained the notion of choice but replaced the soul 
with a Kantian realm of pure, dispassionate reason.292 This produced 
dislocation and skepticism, which attempt to keep concrete human history at a 
distance.293 The seeds of National Socialism are present in this paradigm, 
because “[t]hought becomes a game.”294 People shy away from personal 
commitment to spiritual values.295 
Materialist Marxism “confused the self [le moi] with the body . . . at the 
price of a pure and simple negation of the spirit.”296 Thus, the Marxists “placed 
the body in nature, and accorded it no exceptional standing in the Universe.”297 
For such materialists, “the whole of the spirit’s essence lies in the fact that it is 
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chained to the body.”298 Here again are seeds of National Socialism’s exercise 
of power over the body. 
National Socialism, in turn, replaced the soul with ideas. These were not 
ideas freely appropriated by reason, thereby creating a community of peers.299 
Rather, these were a framework of ideas—the Blut und Boden of the Aryan 
ideal of history—propagated by force.300 The violence attached to ideas 
propagated by force does not dissipate when the ideas find acquiescence in 
subjects. Instead, the force remains, universalizing one final ideal: “war and 
conquest.”301 
Reductive neuroLaw now seeks to complete this trajectory: Kantian “pure” 
reason, stripped of moral sentiment, combined with Marxism’s reduction of 
“person” to “body” and National Socialism’s replacement of “law” with 
violence, to yield a final solution for control over “life” through “neural 
reeducation.” The great philosophical and theological traditions, both East and 
West, offer rich metaphysical resources for resisting this trend towards 
biopolitical nihilism. It is a trend to be resisted at the cost of “life” itself. 
  
 
 298. Id. 
 299. See id. at 69–70. In an authentic community of ideas, Levinas says: 
  The idea propagated detaches itself essentially from its point of departure. In spite of 
the unique accent communicated to it by its creator, it becomes a common heritage. It is 
fundamentally anonymous. The person who accepts it becomes its master, as does the 
person who proposes it. The propagation of an idea thus creates a community of 
‘masters’; it is a process of equalization. To convert or persuade is to create peers. 
Id. at 70. 
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